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To Defer or Not to Defer?
Deference and Its Differential
Impact on First Amendment
Rights in the Roberts Court
Clay Calvert † & Justin B. Hayes ‡
Abstract
This Article examines the concept of deference as it affects First
Amendment speech rights under the Roberts Court. Using six recent
decisions as analytical springboards, including high-profile disputes in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n and Citizens United v.
FEC, the Article illustrates that deference often determines a case’s
outcome. The Article also demonstrates profound disagreements among
the Justices on the use of deference in all six cases. Thus, like a spigot,
deference is turned on and off by individual Justices, and even when
turned on, it can flow freely or be reduced to a trickle. It is precisely
such malleability that makes deference a critical concept on today’s
Court when speech rights hang in the balance. Deference, the Article
argues, muddies judicial analysis because it is a judicial wildcard that
Justices can play—regardless of whether they purport to apply strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review—to help sustain
a law’s constitutionality and, in the process, sacrifice free speech.
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Introduction
More than a half-century ago, sociologist Erving Goffman defined
deference as “that component of activity which functions as a
symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to a
recipient of this recipient, or of something of which this recipient is
taken as a symbol, extension, or agent.” 1 But when courts engage in
deference by acknowledging the wisdom, expertise, or understanding
of others—be it legislative bodies, administrative agencies, 2
institutions, or individuals such as arbitrators, 3 social scientists, 4 and

1.

Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 Am.
Anthropologist 473, 477 (1956).

2.

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has
been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to
the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (explaining the level of deference owed
to an administrative agency’s construction of a statute that it
administers, and noting that, in the absence of express congressional
intent, the Court must determine if the agency has adopted “a
permissible construction of the statute”).

3.

See, e.g., Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e
start with the proposition that judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision
in a labor dispute is extremely limited.”).

4.

See infra Part II.A (describing the majority’s abject lack of deference
toward social scientists in Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011)).
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educators 5—their actions are anything but symbolic. Deference granted and deference denied may, in fact, have profound constitutional
implications that affect free speech rights and reflect on the duties of
the judiciary. 6 This is especially true when judicial deference involves
blanket reliance on the authority of someone or something else to
restrict constitutional rights. 7
On the other hand, deference seems essential in some situations.
For instance, there is “widespread agreement that Congress’s decisions warrant deference [by the Court] because it is a coequal branch
that represents the popular will.” 8 Similarly, when it comes to the
President of the United States, former Chief Justice Warren Burger
once wrote for a unanimous Court that “[t]he President’s need for
complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference
from the courts.” 9
This Article examines how deference—or the lack thereof—has
significantly affected multiple First Amendment-based speech 10 decisions by the United States Supreme Court since John G. Roberts, Jr.
became Chief Justice in September 2005. The sextet of cases analyzed
here, starting with the most recent decision, are: (1) Brown v.

5.

See infra Part II.B (describing the majority’s grant of substantial
deference to a public school principal’s interpretation of a message’s
meaning in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)).

6.

For instance, Justice Antonin Scalia branded it “a striking abdication of
judicial responsibility” for the U.S. Supreme Court to take as “binding”
the views of the executive branch concerning the meaning of a statute or
the views of Congress about the constitutionality of particular
legislation. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 513–14.

7.

Cf. Howard Richards, Deference, 74 Ethics 135, 138–39 (1964)
(“[Deference may] result in reliance on some authority. A may say, ‘I
will defer to D’s judgment, since she seems to have a greater
understanding of human emotions than I have.’ Or he may say, ‘I will
ask my analyst and do what he says.’”).

8.

Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and
Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 893, 894–95 (2003).

9.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).

10.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety years
ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as
fundamental liberties that apply to state and local government entities
and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(explaining that freedom of speech and press are protected “from
impairment by the States” by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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Entertainment Merchants Ass’n; 11 (2) Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project; 12 (3) Citizens United v. FEC; 13 (4) FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc.; 14 (5) Morse v. Frederick; 15 and (6) Beard v. Banks. 16
These cases were selected for scrutiny because they
◦ cover a factually diverse range of deference scenarios;
◦ demonstrate deep disagreements among the justices when it
comes to bestowing deference and, more specifically, to how
much deference should be bestowed; and
◦ illustrate the often negative consequences that granting
substantial deference has on free speech interests.

Although scores of law journal pages are filled with articles about
general concepts like administrative deference, 17 scant scholarship is
devoted specifically to how deference affects First Amendment speech
rights under the Roberts Court across a broad swath of free
expression cases. The cases explored here stretch from governmental
regulation of both violent video games (Brown) and broadcast
indecency (Fox Television Stations) to laws or actions affecting
national security (Humanitarian Law Project), political speech fund11.

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).

12.

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).

13.

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).

14.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I ), 556 U.S. 502 (2009).

15.

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

16.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006).

17.

See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law,
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1671 (2007) (examining the lack of deference given
by Judge Richard A. Posner to administrative judgments on
immigration issues); Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back
(But for How Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the
Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2007)
(examining the deployment of administrative deference by the Supreme
Court and concluding that during the 2006 term, the Court “accorded
administrative agencies more deference in the past year”); Emily
Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111
Colum. L. Rev. 1722 (2011) (examining deference in the context of
administrative law and, in particular, within the context of serial
litigation in administrative law); Connor N. Raso & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical
Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 1727, 1817 (2010) (examining the deference regimes
adopted by Supreme Court Justices, and concluding that “the Justices
apply deference doctrine inconsistently, responding to their ideological
preferences, the policies underlying the major deference regimes, and the
preferences of Congress and the President”).
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Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012
To Defer or Not to Defer?

ing by corporations (Citizens United ), student speech (Morse ), and
inmate expression (Beard ).
Part I of this Article, drawing on literature from outside the law,
initially examines and explicates deference. 18 Part I then illustrates
how the Supreme Court deployed deference in a broad array of First
Amendment cases predating the Roberts Court. 19 After providing this
essential context, Part II analyzes the previously noted opinions
rendered during Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure, 20 concentrating on the
different ways in which deference, or the lack thereof, affected the free
speech interests at stake. 21
Finally, the Article concludes by asserting that deference, given
the wide disagreements about it in each of the half-dozen cases
analyzed here, constitutes a judicial wildcard that Justices can play
when dealt a First Amendment hand. Specifically, deference is a
malleable concept they can invoke, regardless of the name of the
standard of review they purport to apply, to help ease the burden of
sustaining a law’s constitutionality or, in the case of Morse, a
government official’s censorial actions. 22 Ultimately, the Article demonstrates that deference’s elasticity makes it ripe for misuse and
abuse that often leave First Amendment rights hanging out to dry. 23

I.

Explicating Deference and Its Role in
First Amendment Jurisprudence

This Part has two sections, the first of which provides a primer
on deference, while the second explores how deference seeps into
modern, yet pre-Roberts First Amendment jurisprudence.
A.

The Pervasive and Persuasive Nature of Deference

Deference is a type of behavior that permeates human existence
from an early age. Cornell University Professor Robert V. Presthus
wrote more than fifty years ago that “from infancy on the individual
is trained to defer to authority. He develops over time a generalized
deference to the authority of parenthood, experience, knowledge,
power, and status.” 24 It thus comes as no surprise that deference
infuses the legal system, in which multiple people and institutions
18.

See infra Part I.A.

19.

See infra Part I.B.

20.

See supra notes 11–16; infra Part II.

21.

See infra Part II.

22.

See infra Part II.B.

23.

See infra Conclusion.

24.

Robert V. Presthus, Toward a Theory of Organizational Behavior, 3
Admin. Sci. Q. 48, 57 (1958).
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hold positions of authority—from the Justices on the High Court to
the members of Congress to the chairs of administrative agencies.
Acts of deference constitute “status behaviors” based on honor
and esteem. 25 In particular, as sociology professor Brian Colwell
observed, “[a]cts of deference communicate one person’s yielding of
their own will, ideas, or interests to those of another, and by doing so,
highlight the power and prestige differences between them.” 26
Although drawn from sociology, this description is relevant for the
law because one must query whether it is constitutionally proper for
Supreme Court Justices to yield their own will to the ideas of others.
How much power, for example, should be bestowed on social scientists
(Brown), educators (Morse), prison officials (Beard) or administrative
agencies (Fox Television Stations) when First Amendment interests
hang in the balance?
Sociologists observe that “[d]eference is symbolic power in potential form: once deference is acquired, it can be deployed as the
symbolic power to frame actions, situations, and events in ways that
induce compliance and constitute the social order.” 27 Here too one
finds relevance for the study of judicial deference in free speech cases.
One must consider, for instance, whether sanctioning social scientists
with deference improperly vests them with too much power to influence judicial framing of censorship issues. A pivotal problem is the
vast disconnect between social science frames and legal frames.
Framing issues in terms of statistical significance, derived from tightly
controlled—more derisively, contrived—experiments, simply does not
comport with framing legal issues in terms of real-world injuries and
the more subjective interests-of-justice balancing that transpire in
First Amendment contexts.
Although difficult to define from a legal perspective, deference
generally “involves a decisionmaker (D1) setting aside its own judgment and following the judgment of another decisionmaker (D2) in
circumstances in which the deferring decisionmaker, D1, might have
reached a different decision.” 28 As Paul Horwitz encapsulated it,
deference can be defined “as a decisionmaker’s decision to follow a
determination made by some other individual or institution that it
might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question

25.

Brian Colwell, Deference or Respect? Status Management Practices
Among Prison Inmates, 70 Soc. Psychol. Q. 442, 442 (2007).

26.

Id. at 443.

27.

Tim Hallett, Between Deference and Distinction: Interaction Ritual
Through Symbolic Power in an Educational Institution, 70 Soc.
Psychol. Q. 148, 149 (2007).

28.

Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1061, 1073 (2008).
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independently.” 29 Professors Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer
offered an even simpler definition, writing that “we temporarily set
aside the issue of the strength of deference and consider a decisionmaker to have deferred whenever she takes someone else’s
decision to be a reason for making the same decision.” 30
To the extent judicial deference is not mandated by another
authority, 31 it necessarily is discretionary. 32 In such discretionary
situations, when deference should be given, to whom deference should
be given and how much deference should be given thus become key
issues. Deference, in brief, is not binary but a matter of degree. In
some areas of the law, it ranges on a continuum “from great respect
at one end to near indifference at the other.” 33 John Paul Stevens
wrote in June 2010, shortly before his retirement from the Court, 34
that “[t]he degree to which we defer to a judgment by the political
branches must vary up and down with the degree to which that
judgment reflects considered, public-minded decisionmaking.” 35 Cases
thus often initially revolve around deciding what “the appropriate
level of deference” is. 36
B.

Deference and Free Speech

Deference often influences cases involving the First Amendment
freedom of speech, despite the High Court’s rather ringing statement
more than thirty years ago in Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia that “[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial
29.

Id. at 1078.

30.

Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1363 (1997) (emphasis added).

31.

See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
Yale L.J. 969, 971 (1992) (describing the “principle of mandatory
deference” in which “courts are compelled to defer to agency
interpretations because Congress has directed them to defer”).

32.

See id. (explaining that in this model, courts defer in the name of
“sound judicial decisionmaking”).

33.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (internal
citations omitted).

34.

See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Supreme
Ct. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last
visited Sept. 19, 2012) (observing that “Justice Stevens retired from the
Supreme Court on June 29, 2010”).

35.

Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2830 n.3 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).

36.

See, e.g., Lopez v. Terrell, 654 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We
determine first the appropriate level of deference to afford the agency’s
interpretation . . . .”); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 124
(2d Cir. 2011) (“It is worth reemphasizing that the primary thrust of
our decision is whether the district court applied the appropriate level of
deference when reviewing the arbitration award.”).
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inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.” 37 For instance,
when considering the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, Justice Anthony
Kennedy observed that predictive judgments by Congress must be
given substantial deference. 38 The Court’s role in such cases, Kennedy
opined, is only to ensure that Congress drew reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence. 39 He added that “substantiality is to be
measured in this context by a standard more deferential than we
accord to judgments of an administrative agency.” 40 Such vast deference is granted because of both congressional expertise 41 and
separation-of-power concerns regarding respect for congressional authority. As Justice Kennedy put it:
We owe Congress’ findings an additional measure of deference
out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power.
Even in the realm of First Amendment questions where
Congress must base its conclusions upon substantial evidence,
deference must be accorded to its findings as to the harm to be
avoided and to the remedial measures adopted for that end, lest
we infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy. 42

Subsequent to Turner, the Supreme Court in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale considered whether a New Jersey public
accommodations law that required the Boy Scouts to admit a gay
adult as an assistant scoutmaster violated “the Boy Scouts’ First
Amendment right of expressive association.” 43 In concluding this right
was indeed violated, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for the
majority that “[a]s we give deference to an association’s assertions
regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give deference to
an association’s view of what would impair its expression.” 44 Professor
Nat Stern thus wrote that “Dale proclaimed a doctrine of deference to

37.

Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).

38.

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997).

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

See id. at 196 (“Though different in degree, the deference to Congress is
in one respect akin to deference owed to administrative agencies because
of their expertise.” (emphasis added)).

42.

Id.

43.

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).

44.

Id. at 653.
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both an association’s assertion of the substance of its message and its
view of conditions for preserving that expression.” 45
Rehnquist’s position revealed a deep division, however, among the
Justices on the intersection of deference and First Amendment rights.
In a dissent joined by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
and Stephen Breyer, John Paul Stevens called Rehnquist’s belief
about deference
an astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any previous
instance in which our analysis of the scope of a constitutional
right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his
or her brief and inquiring no further. It is even more astonishing
in the First Amendment area, because, as the majority itself
acknowledges, “we are obligated to independently review the
factual record.” It is an odd form of independent review that
consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims. 46

Dale plainly illustrates that whether and when to grant deference
in First Amendment disputes is not a task on which all Justices agree
in all cases. In fact, as Part II of this Article illustrates, disagreements
on deference have pervaded multiple high-profile speech cases since
John Roberts first donned the Chief Justice’s robes in late 2005.
Indeed, deference is a notion over which today’s Justices often badly
fracture.
In another First Amendment context, the Court is wary of
granting too much deference. This is the situation when administrative agencies involved in licensing and permit cases create schemes
conferring upon themselves too much discretion to curb speech. 47 In
the context of administrative law, deference, as Professor James T.
O’Reilly wrote, can be loosely defined “as the willingness of a court to
accept an agency’s interpretations of a statute or policy over
competing interpretations offered by regulated persons or public
interest groups.” 48
The various tests and rules the Supreme Court uses to measure
the constitutional validity of restrictions on speech also reflect what
might be considered built-in levels of deference. For instance, the
Court’s time, place, and manner jurisprudence involving intermediate
45.

Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 Buff.
L. Rev. 847, 911 (2011).

46.

Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

47.

Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative
Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2029,
2049 (2011).

48.

James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century:
Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93
Cornell L. Rev. 939, 941 (2008).
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scrutiny has been characterized by First Amendment scholar Kathleen
Sullivan as “relatively deferential.” 49 In contrast, the strict scrutiny
standard of review 50 that typically applies to content-based restrictions on speech is far less deferential. 51
But even when they interpret the meaning of (and apply) a
relatively deferential test like intermediate scrutiny, the Justices
sometimes still disagree on how much deference should be afforded to
another body or institution. For instance, in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism the majority upheld a noise-amplification restriction imposed
on a bandshell in New York City’s Central Park as a permissible
time, place, and manner regulation. 52 In doing so, the majority
chastised the lower appellate court for “failing to defer to the city’s
reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume would
be best served by requiring bandshell performers to utilize the city’s
sound technician.” 53 In addition, the majority held that intermediate
scrutiny does not require a government entity to adopt “the least
restrictive or least intrusive means” 54 of serving a substantial interest
but, rather, only that “the means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government’s interest.” 55
In sharp contrast, Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a dissent joined
by Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens, found the
majority’s analysis in Ward far too deferential:

49.

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution, and City Regulation
of Speech, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 209, 217 (1998).

50.

See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) (“[A] content-based speech restriction . . . can stand only if it
satisfies strict scrutiny. If a statute regulates speech based on its content,
it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict
Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 743, 745 (2003) (“Under the guise of
strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment
to require that state actors imposing a content-based restriction on
speech prove that the restriction (1) advances a compelling government
interest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that end. The Court
includes under the latter prong an inquiry into whether the state action
in question offers the least restrictive means of achieving the state’s
allegedly compelling interest.” (footnote omitted)).

51.

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent
with it.”).

52.

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).

53.

Id. at 800.

54.

Id. at 798.

55.

Id. at 800.

22

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012
To Defer or Not to Defer?
Until today, a key safeguard of free speech has been government’s obligation to adopt the least intrusive restriction
necessary to achieve its goals. By abandoning the requirement
that time, place, and manner regulations must be narrowly
tailored, the majority replaces constitutional scrutiny with mandatory deference. The majority’s willingness to give government
officials a free hand in achieving their policy ends extends so far
as to permit, in this case, government control of speech in
advance of its dissemination. 56

Commercial speech 57 is also subject to a more relaxed form of
intermediate scrutiny, 58 but here again Justices sometimes split on the
appropriate degree of deference that must be given. For instance, in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 59 which involved a restriction
on billboards due partly to aesthetic concerns, Justice Byron White
sparred with then-Justice Rehnquist. White wrote that despite
Rehnquist’s belief that the essence of democracy involves deference to
legislative judgments that distinguish between categories of content,
“it has been this Court’s consistent position that democracy stands on
a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests
against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational
legislative judgments in this area.” 60 In White’s view, Rehnquist
“misconceive[d] the nature of the judicial function in this situation.” 61
56.

Id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

57.

What constitutes commercial speech is not easily defined, with the U.S.
Supreme Court observing “the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will
clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.” City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993). See
Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism
and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 67, 74 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has cryptically offered a
number of different—and not always consistent—definitions of
commercial speech . . . .”).

58.

See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324,
1339 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court “held that restrictions on
nonmisleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity must
withstand intermediate scrutiny”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the
intermediate scrutiny applied in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)); see also Tamara R. Piety,
Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the
Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 181, 182 (2007)
(“[T]he commercial speech doctrine creates a category of speech subject
to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.”).

59.

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality
opinion).

60.

Id. at 519.

61.

Id. at 520.
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Also weighing in with White on the side of a less deferential approach
was Justice William Brennan, who observed that “[o]f course, it is not
for a court to impose its own notion of beauty on San Diego. But
before deferring to a city’s judgment, a court must be convinced that
the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment.” 62
Rehnquist, however, took an opposite tack—one of extreme
deference:
I do not think a city should be put to the task of convincing a
local judge that the elimination of billboards would have more
than a negligible impact on aesthetics. Nothing in my experience on the bench has led me to believe that a judge is in any
better position than a city or county commission to make
decisions in an area such as aesthetics. 63

Indeed, when it comes to matters such as aesthetics in considering
whether they constitute important or substantial interests under
intermediate scrutiny, attorney Darrel C. Menthe recently wrote that
“the legitimacy of such justifications largely depends on deference to
legislative pronouncements of purpose. There is rarely any strong
connection between the stated purpose and the effects of the
legislation.” 64
In 1991, the Justices again disagreed on deference, this time in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada 65 when considering the constitutionality of state rules restricting extrajudicial statements by Nevada
attorneys. Justice Kennedy captured well the disagreement in Gentile
as to whether to defer to the professional judgment of the State Bar
of Nevada in disciplining its attorneys for their exercise of speech. He
wrote that “[w]e have not in recent years accepted our colleagues’
apparent theory . . . that we will defer to professional bodies when
those restrictions impinge upon First Amendment freedoms.” 66 In
other words, Kennedy suggested that when free speech interests are at
stake, deference should not be given to professional organizations such
as a state bar. In opposition to this view, Chief Justice Rehnquist
opined that

62.

Id. at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring).

63.

Id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

64.

Darrel C. Menthe, Aesthetic Regulation and the Development of First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 225, 228 (2010)
(emphasis added).

65.

Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).

66.

Id. at 1054.
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[t]he State Bar of Nevada, which made its own factual findings,
and the Supreme Court of Nevada, which upheld those findings,
were in a far better position than we are to appreciate the likely
effect of petitioner’s statements on potential members of a jury
panel in a highly publicized case such as this. 67

This Part of the Article made it apparent that deference is an
extremely pliable concept upon which Justices often disagree, both as
to whether it should be bestowed and, if so, the level or quantum of
deference that should be granted. With this background in mind, the
Article now examines six First Amendment cases—all decided during
John Roberts’s tenure as chief justice—to better understand both
when and how deference is deployed by the Court and on whom it is
bestowed. Perhaps more importantly, they reveal how deference given
and deference denied affect freedom of speech today.

II. Free Speech Rulings Under the Roberts Court:
Six Cases Illustrate Varying Degrees of
Deference and Disagreements Among the Justices
This Part analyzes a half-dozen decisions by the Roberts Court
affecting First Amendment speech rights in which the Justices fractured on the level of deference—if any—that should be extended to
another entity, institution, or individual. Each case demonstrates
divisions among the Justices on deference that sometimes are reflected
in back-and-forth exchanges across majority, plurality, and dissenting
opinions.
A. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n:
Should Deference Be Given to Social Scientists?

The case that perhaps best illustrates the split among the current
Justices on deference is the most recent one examined here, Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n. 68 The deference issue in Brown actually was double layered. The first level involved the extent of deference the Justices should give to the expertise and findings of social
scientists when it comes to the alleged harms caused by playing
violent video games. The second layer, in turn, centered on how much
deference the Justices should grant to the legislative bodies (in this
case, the California legislature) that rely on such social science
evidence in adopting legislation.
As explained later, the majority in Brown granted no deference to
the findings of the social scientists in declaring California’s violent
video game law unconstitutional. 69 That law required the labeling,
67.

Id. at 1080 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

68.

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).

69.

See infra notes 80–86 and accompanying text.
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with a solid white “18” outlined in black, of all violent video games
imported into or distributed in the Golden State, 70 and also made it
an offense, punishable by a maximum $1,000 fine, 71 to “sell or rent a
video game that has been labeled as a violent video game to a
minor.” 72 The social science research that California contended supported the law in Brown consisted largely of work by Iowa State
University’s Dr. Craig Anderson. 73
Stephen Breyer, it turned out, was the lone Justice to defer both
to the social scientists and to California lawmakers, like Leland Yee,
who relied on social science data in proposing the law at issue in
Brown. 74 Breyer did this despite acknowledging disagreements among
social scientists as to whether playing violent video games causes
harm. In a key paragraph, Justice Breyer opined:
Like many, perhaps most, studies of human behavior, each
study has its critics, and some of those critics have produced
studies of their own in which they reach different conclusions. (I
list both sets of research in the appendixes.) I, like most judges,
lack the social science expertise to say definitively who is right.
But associations of public health professionals who do possess
that expertise have reviewed many of these studies and found a
significant risk that violent video games, when compared with
more passive media, are particularly likely to cause children
harm. 75

In other words, Justice Breyer deferred, letting associations of
public health professionals serve as arbiters of the value and merit of
70.

Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.2 (West 2009).

71.

See id. § 1746.3 (“Any person who violates any provision of this title
shall be liable in an amount of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or a
lesser amount as determined by the court. However, this liability shall
not apply to any person who violates those provisions if he or she is
employed solely in the capacity of a salesclerk or other, similar position
and he or she does not have an ownership [or managerial] interest in the
business . . . .”).

72.

Id. § 1746.1(a).

73.

See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188
RMW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472, at *31 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007)
(noting that California “relie[d] heavily on the work of Dr. Anderson”),
aff’d, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).

74.

When California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Assembly Bill
1179 into law in October 2005, Yee asserted that “[s]tudy upon study
shows that these ultraviolent games have harmful effects on our
children.” John M. Broder, Bill is Signed to Restrict Video Games in
California, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2005, at A11.

75.

Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2769 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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social science data produced by researchers such as Dr. Anderson.
Breyer, for instance, cited reports and statements by groups including
the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, and the American
Academy of Family Physicians. 76
Breyer followed up this substantial serving of deference to research and professional experts with a heaping helping of deference to
the legislative body that relied on those experts:
Unlike the majority, I would find sufficient grounds in these
studies and expert opinions for this Court to defer to an elected
legislature’s conclusion that the video games in question are particularly likely to harm children. This Court has always thought it
owed an elected legislature some degree of deference in respect to
legislative facts of this kind, particularly when they involve technical matters that are beyond our competence, and even in First
Amendment cases. 77

Justice Breyer’s deferential approach is extremely significant for
three main reasons. First and most obvious, Breyer’s deference would
have resulted in a pro-censorship decision upholding California’s law
had he been able to gather support for his views from enough of his
fellow Justices in Brown. The expertise of social scientists, at least in
terms of proving harms to minors, would have been sufficient to
trump the First Amendment rights of those same minors, along with
the speech rights of those who create and distribute violent video
games.
Second, Breyer’s deference to social scientists involves a two-step
methodology. Specifically, Breyer did not defer directly to individual
social scientists such as Dr. Anderson. Instead, Breyer relied on the
review, vetting, and analysis of their work by learned organizations.
In other words, he depended on the stamp of approval or the
imprimatur of organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Psychological Association. 78 Thus, while
individual social scientists themselves may possess expertise, Breyer
did not bow to that expertise until larger bodies, composed of
multiple experts, endorsed or otherwise gave their stamp of approval
to that research.
Third, Breyer demonstrated a willingness to defer to the judgment of the abovementioned learned organizations despite recognizing
a disagreement among individual social scientists about whether
playing violent video games causes harm. 79 In brief, a discrepancy
76.

Id. at 2769–70.

77.

Id. at 2770 (emphasis added).

78.

Id. at 2769–70.

79.

Id. at 2769.
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among experts at the individual or micro level did not bother Breyer
because, at the organizational or macro level, there was agreement
among a cadre of experts. This appears to be a quite realistic
approach in terms of embracing social science research because
disagreements among social scientists seem inevitable.
In stark contrast, the five-Justice majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by Justices Anthony
Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan,
offered social scientists no deference or slack. Justice Scalia wrote that
social science evidence must be “compelling” 80 and entail more than
“ambiguous proof” 81 in order to demonstrate, with a “degree of
certitude,” 82 the existence of an “actual problem.” 83 Furthermore,
Scalia was clear that social scientists must produce data that possess
real-world generalizability 84 such that they demonstrate more than
“minuscule real-world effects, such as children’s feeling more aggressive or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a violent
game than after playing a nonviolent game.” 85 Justice Scalia
emphasized that contrived experiments conducted by social scientists
can be so far removed from legal issues as to be irrelevant. For
example, he wrote that one study cited by California
found that children who had just finished playing violent video
games were more likely to fill in the blank letter in ‘explo _e’
with a ‘d’ (so that it reads ‘explode’) than with an ‘r’
(‘explore’). The prevention of this phenomenon, which might
have been anticipated with common sense, is not a compelling
state interest. 86

In summary, Brown indicates a dramatic disconnect among the
current Justices on the deference that should be accorded to social
scientists and, more specifically, to their research findings. Justice
Breyer’s embrace of a deferential approach—one that tolerates ambiguity in research findings and defers to the seal of approval granted
by learned organizations—led him to pen a dissent that cuts deeply
80.

See id. at 2739 (majority opinion) (“The State’s evidence is not
compelling.”).

81.

Id. (“[A]mbiguous proof will not suffice.”).

82.

Id. at 2739 n.8.

83.

Id. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S.
803, 822 (2000)).

84.

External validity is “the measure of a particular study’s
generalizability.”
Jennings
Bryant
&
Susan
Thompson,
Fundamentals of Media Effects 15 (1st ed. 2002).

85.

Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739.

86.

Id. at 2739 n.7 (citation omitted).
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against First Amendment freedoms. In contrast, the majority’s
rigorous demands imposed on social scientists and their research—a
decidedly non-deferential approach—led to a pro-free speech result.
Deference—or, more accurately, the lack thereof—thus proved critical
in Brown.
Justice Scalia and the majority must be lauded for not being
deferentially blinded, as it were, by science. 87 It often is difficult not
to be blinded because, as Professor Elaine E. Sutherland wrote in
2006 when considering the persuasiveness of expert scientific
testimony:
Science is perceived as solid, knowable, measurable: in short,
science offers certainty. These factors combine to place the
person who does understand science, the expert, in an incredibly
powerful position. After all, if one is coming from a position of
ignorance, the person who holds the key to that certain body of
knowledge is something of a savior. 88

Whether future decisions involving the consideration of social
science evidence by the Roberts Court come down hard on social
scientists or whether they adopt the far more deferential stance of
Justice Breyer remains to be seen.
B. Morse v. Frederick: Deference to Educators
in Interpreting an Ambiguous Message’s Meaning

When it comes to students’ speech rights, there is a widely held
assumption or perception that courts inevitably will defer to the
judgments of school officials. 89 But this has not always been the case.
Most notably, Justice Hugo Black found himself isolated in dissent in
the seminal student-speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District 90 when he called for unbridled judicial
deference to the decisions of school authorities. 91
87.

Cf. Thomas Dolby, She Blinded Me with Science, on The Best of
Thomas Dolby: Retrospectacle (EMI 1994) (singing, in early new
wave fashion, “she blinded me with science and failed me in biology”).

88.

Elaine E. Sutherland, Undue Deference to Experts Syndrome?, 16 Ind.
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 375, 381–82 (2006) (footnote omitted).

89.

See, e.g., Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are “Persons”
Under Our Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1323, 1348 (2009) (remarking on “the extraordinary deference that
is afforded to administrators in managing school affairs and the
relatively low value afforded to the speech of young people” (emphasis
added)).

90.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

91.

Criticizing the Tinker majority’s ruling in favor of the First Amendment
speech rights of public school students, Justice Black wrote that “the
Court arrogates to itself, rather than to the State’s elected officials
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Fast-forward to the Roberts Court and, more specifically, to five
years ago in Morse v. Frederick. 92 That’s when the Justices faced a
student-speech controversy involving a banner that cryptically, 93 albeit
somewhat amusingly, bore the message “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.” 94 A key
issue in the case was the meaning of this sign, with its studentcreator, Joseph Frederick, claiming “the words were just nonsense
meant to attract television cameras” 95 and that it was “meaningless
and funny.” 96 Principal Deborah Morse, however, believed it “would
be construed by students, District personnel, parents and others
witnessing the display of the banner, as advocating or promoting
illegal drug use.” 97
In ruling in favor of the principal’s decision to suspend Frederick
and, in the process, in favor of the principal’s interpretation of the
meaning of the 420ish-turned phrase 98 “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” Chief
Justice John Roberts deferred on the pivotal question of meaning to
Deborah Morse’s interpretation. In particular, the Chief Justice labeled her understanding “plainly a reasonable one.” 99 Deference to the
principal’s interpretation under this very lax reasonableness standard, 100 in turn, resulted in a pro-censorship decision. This came
despite Chief Justice Roberts’s frank acknowledgement that
charged with running the schools, the decision as to which school
disciplinary regulations are ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 517 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Black blasted this “permissiveness in this
country fostered by the judiciary” in allowing students to “defy and
flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own
schoolwork.” Id. at 518.
92.

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

93.

Id. at 401 (“The message on Frederick’s banner is cryptic.”).

94.

See id. at 397 (explaining that student Joseph Frederick and his friends,
while standing across the street from Juneau-Douglas High School as the
Olympic Torch Relay passed through Juneau, Alaska, “unfurled a 14foot banner bearing the phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS’”).

95.

Id. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th Cir.
2006)).

96.

Id. at 402 (quoting Morse, 439 F.3d at 1116).

97.

Id. at 401.

98.

Cf. Colleen O’Connor & John Ingold, A Number of Things to Rally
Around at 420, Denver Post, Apr. 21, 2010, at 1B ( “The term ‘420,’
now street slang for marijuana use, was first used by a group of San
Rafael, Calif., high school students to refer to the time they’d meet after
school to smoke dope. The annual pot celebration is held April 20.”).

99.

Morse, 551 U.S. at 401.

100. Justice Thomas wrote elsewhere that “[i]t was reasonable for her to
conclude that the banner promoted illegal drug use.” Id. at 410
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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“[g]ibberish is surely a possible interpretation of the words on the
banner.” 101 The Morse majority’s decision to accede to the principal’s
interpretation of meaning thus is consistent with what Professor Lee
Goldman called in 2011 the Court’s “increasing deference to the
choices made by school administrators” since Tinker. 102
John Paul Stevens, however, dissented in Morse. A key part of his
dissent questioned the deference bestowed to Principal Morse’s
interpretation. As Stevens wrote, “it is one thing to restrict speech
that advocates drug use. It is another thing entirely to prohibit an
obscure message with a drug theme that a third party subjectively—
and not very reasonably—thinks is tantamount to express
advocacy.” 103 The third party here, of course, is Deborah Morse, and
the obscure message is “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.” Criticizing the majority’s
approach to meaning, Stevens added that “[o]n occasion, the Court
suggests it is deferring to the principal’s ‘reasonable’ judgment that
Frederick’s sign qualified as drug advocacy. At other times, the Court
seems to say that it thinks the banner’s message constitutes express
advocacy. Either way, its approach is indefensible.” 104 Stevens, in
brief, refused to grant Principal Morse’s interpretation of meaning any
deference and, instead, concluded that the banner’s “silly” and
“nonsensical” messages should be protected by the First Amendment. 105
As with Brown, Morse reveals the power of deference to affect
free speech rights. In particular, deference granted would have resulted in censorship in both Brown (had the Court adopted Justice
Breyer’s deferential stance to social scientists in his dissent) and
Morse (where the majority did, in fact, defer to the principal’s interpretation of the message), while deference denied would lead to First
Amendment victories in both cases (as it did in Brown, where the
majority granted no deference to the expertise of either social
scientists or the state legislature, and as it would have in Morse had
Justice Stevens’s dissent been able to carry the day). Both cases, in
turn, reveal that the Justices are not unified when it comes to granting deference to either social scientists or public school administrators.
Does the majority’s deference to public school educators in Morse
square with prior student-speech decisions? In a post-Morse article,
Professor Aaron H. Caplan of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles
asserts that the Supreme Court’s analysis nearly seventy years ago in
the flag-salute case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
101. Id. at 402 (majority opinion).
102. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment:
Comprehensive Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395, 398 (2011).
103. Morse, 551 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 441 (first emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
105. Id. at 446.
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Barnette 106 features its most lengthy, intense statement on deference
to educators. 107 The Barnette majority made readily apparent that it
would not grant blanket deference to educators, opining that school
boards are imbued with
important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none
that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes. 108

On the other hand, a majority of the Court in 1975 made it
evident that some deference is owed to educators, noting that “[t]he
system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies
necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators
and school board members.” 109
Perhaps the pre-Morse decision that best illustrates an unsettled
notion of deference to public school educators is Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser. 110 In upholding school officials’ right to punish a
student for giving a speech packed with sexual innuendoes to a
captive audience of minors, 111 the majority of the Court opined that
“[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board”
and “schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct
such as that indulged in by this confused boy.” 112
Yet, in a concurring opinion apparently designed to rein in
deference to educators, Justice William Brennan wrote that school
officials do not possess “limitless discretion to apply their own notions
106. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
107. Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 Wash.
L. Rev. 71, 89 (2010) (“Justice [Felix] Frankfurter’s cries for deference
to school administrators were relegated to a fretful dissent in Barnette,
and no subsequent Supreme Court decision about student speech rights
has restated it at similar length or intensity.” (footnote omitted)).
108. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added).
109. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (emphasis added).
110. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
111. See id. at 677 (observing that student Matthew Fraser delivered a
speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office in front of
about 600 students, and noting that Fraser described “his candidate in
terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor”).
112. Id. at 683.
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of indecency. Courts have a First Amendment responsibility to insure
that robust rhetoric . . . is not suppressed by prudish failures to
distinguish the vigorous from the vulgar . . . .” 113 Two years after
Fraser, Brennan, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry
Blackmun, again dissented in a student-speech case, Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier. 114 Brennan wrote that while the Court generally
defers to local school boards on the daily operations of school systems,
“[w]e have not, however, hesitated to intervene where their decisions
run afoul of the Constitution.” 115 Demonstrating no deference to the
decision of the principal in Kuhlmeier to censor articles relating to
students’ experiences with pregnancy and the impact of divorce on
students, Brennan brusquely wrote that the principal
objected to some material in two articles, but excised six entire
articles. He did not so much as inquire into obvious alternatives,
such as precise deletions or additions (one of which had already
been made), rearranging the layout, or delaying publication.
Such unthinking contempt for individual rights is intolerable
from any state official. It is particularly insidious from one to
whom the public entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an
appreciation for the cherished democratic liberties that our
Constitution guarantees. 116

Such language reflects a decided lack of deference to school
officials. It thus is clear that the split on deference in Morse regarding
the meaning of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” is nothing new but instead
reflects long-standing differences among various Justices in the studentspeech arena.
While a majority of Justices in Morse certainly embraced deference, the dissent of Justice Stevens, which was joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Souter, demonstrates that deference is neither automatic nor uniformly agreed upon in educational settings. One thing is
clear, however: when deference is bestowed on school officials, it
113. Id. at 689–90 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of
Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
114. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). This case
involved censorship in a high school newspaper of student-written articles
about pregnancy and divorce. The majority held that “educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.” Id. at 273. The majority suggested such pedagogical concerns
include “speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or
unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. at 271.
115. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
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results in censorship. Judicial pushback from the likes of Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Souter in Morse thus is essential as a bulwark to
safeguard student expression from the censorial proclivities of school
officials in a post-Columbine world. 117
C. Citizens United v. FEC: Deference Denied to
Congress Opens Spending Spigots for Political Speech

One of the most controversial 118 First Amendment-based decisions
during the Roberts Court was its 2010 fractured ruling in Citizens
United v. FEC. 119 Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of
the Court: (1) overruling Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce; 120 (2) holding that “[t]he Government may regulate corporate
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it
may not suppress that speech altogether;” 121 and (3) striking down a
federal law restricting corporate independent expenditures prior to
elections. 122
These results, this Section argues, reflect a rejection of deference
by a majority of the Justices in Citizens United on two distinct levels:

117. See generally Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for
Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech
Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 First Amend. L. Rev.
210, 243–44 (2008) (“[S]ince the tragedy at Columbine High School in
April 1999, courts have granted vast deference to school officials when it
comes to squelching any speech that can be perceived as a threat of
violence.” (footnote omitted)).
118. For instance, the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United has been
compared with the Court’s infamous decision in Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1857), that treated blacks as property rather than citizens.
Current U.S. Senator and erstwhile presidential candidate John Kerry
called Citizens United “the worst, the most dangerous decision in the
country since Dred Scott.” Alex Leary, Attack Ads Grow with Rise of
the Super PAC, St. Petersburg Times (Fla.), July 24, 2011, at 1A.
And Duke Thomas, the founder of a political action committee called
“We Are the 99% Movement,” said, “Citizens United is the worst
decision for this country since Dred Scott. Saying corporations are
people is as bad as saying people are property.” Luke Rosiak, The Super
PAC to End All Super PACs?, Wash. Times, Feb. 6, 2012, at A3.
119. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
120. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In
Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan statute that required corporations
to make all independent political expenditures through a segregated
fund consisting of money solicited expressly for political purposes
because the law “reduces the threat that huge corporate treasuries
amassed with the aid of favorable state laws will be used to influence
unfairly the outcome of elections.” Id. at 669.
121. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
122. Id. at 917.
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◦ rejection of deference to congressional action that was taken
in the name of remedying perceived flaws in political speech
marketplaces; and
◦ rejection of the deference accorded to prior decisions that is
embodied in the principle of stare decisis, at least when those
prior decisions conflict with long-standing principles of First
Amendment theory.

The central issue in Citizens United involved the constitutionality
of portions of a federal law 123 prohibiting corporations from using
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for electioneering communications and for speech expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate. 124 Also at issue was a related series
of FEC regulations that were so complex they would, as Justice
Kennedy wrote, “force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney,
conduct demographic marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings
before discussing the most salient political issues of our day.” 125 The
overall effect was to make it “a felony for all corporations—including
nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the
election or defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a
general election.” 126
In declaring the law unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy perfunctorily referenced the “due deference” 127 that must be given to
Congress and acknowledged that the Court “must give weight to
attempts by Congress” 128 to remedy perceived problems. In this case,
those congressionally identified problems were the alleged “corruption
or its appearance” 129 that corporate political speech might cause on
elections and that, in turn, a ban on corporate expenditures might
prevent.
But Justice Kennedy quickly made it clear in the same paragraph
that such deference is not extensive, at least when: (1) the speech is

123. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010).
124. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (“Federal law prohibits corporations
and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or
for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.”).
125. Id. at 889.
126. Id. at 897.
127. Id. at 911.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 908.
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political; (2) the imposed sanctions are criminal; 130 and (3) congressional action conflicts with supposedly long-standing First
Amendment principles. After stating the obvious—“Congress may not
choose an unconstitutional remedy” 131—Kennedy elaborated that
congressional remedial action “must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less,
is the governing rule. An outright ban on corporate political speech
during the critical pre-election period is not a permissible remedy.” 132
In brief—and, at least, in Justice Kennedy’s view—the congressionally imposed remedy for its anticorruption interest could not
permissibly take the form of a speech-reducing statute due to its
conflict with the time-honored counterspeech doctrine 133 that Congress
chose to ignore. As Justice Louis Brandeis wrote for the High Court
eighty-five years ago: “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.” 134 In summary, the congressional action at issue in Citizens
United conflicted with long-standing First Amendment theory and, in
turn, the First Amendment theory of “more speech, not less” 135
simply had to prevail.
In addition, much like Justice Scalia (with whom Kennedy joined)
in Brown lambasted social science for failing to demonstrate causal
evidence of any harm to minors, 136 Kennedy in Citizens United found
that Congress offered “only scant evidence that independent
expenditures even ingratiate,” 137 much less corrupt. 138 In other words,
just as the non-deferential approach of Justice Scalia in Brown lead to
his conclusion that there was no evidence of any problem that
justified remedial legislative action, so too did Justice Kennedy’s
deference-light approach in Citizens United result in a determination
130. On this point, Kennedy wrote that “under our law and our tradition it
seems stranger than fiction for our Government to make this political
speech a crime. Yet this is the statute’s purpose and design.” Id. at 917.
131. Id. at 911.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000:
A New Look at the Old Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. Rev.
553 (discussing the counterspeech doctrine and providing examples of its
use).
134. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
135. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (emphasis added).
136. See supra Part II.A.
137. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
138. See id. (“Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption.”).
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that there was no evidence demonstrating an actual problem requiring
legislative redress existed.
University of Chicago Law School Professor Aziz Z. Huq recently
observed that “the Citizens United Court pointed to a specific absence
of evidence that the asserted government interest was furthered by
the corporate expenditure ban” 139 and “catalogued the absence of
evidence that corporate expenditures were being exchanged for legislative votes.” 140 In accord with the same decidedly non-deferential
evidentiary approach in Brown, Professor Huq characterized the majority’s tack in Citizens United as “a truly strict scrutiny standard,” 141
adding his own emphasis to the word strict. Professor Huq sums up
Citizens United as reflecting “beady-eyed skepticism.” 142
Chief Justice John Roberts filed a concurring opinion in Citizens
United that was joined by Justice Samuel Alito. 143 Like Kennedy, the
Chief Justice suggested that deference to congressional findings is
essential when he quoted a concurrence authored eighty-five years
earlier by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for the proposition that
“[j]udging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is ‘the gravest
and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform.’” 144
Yet Roberts, in supporting Justice Kennedy’s decision to go beyond
the statutory issue—the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b—and
reach the larger question of whether Austin remained good law,
bluntly wrote that “[t]here is a difference between judicial restraint
and judicial abdication.” 145
Justice Kennedy, in Citizens United, found that deference could
not stand in the way of striking down a statute that conflicted with
long-standing First Amendment principles that provide political speech
with heightened protection to serve enlightened self-government 146 and
the counterspeech tradition. 147 Likewise, Chief Justice Roberts would
139. Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others,
112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 16, 23 (2012).
140. Id. at 18–19.
141. Id. at 18.
142. Id. at 29.
143. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
144. Id. at 917–18 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)
(Holmes, J., concurring)).
145. Id. at 919.
146. See id. at 898 (majority opinion) (“Speech is an essential mechanism of
democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the
people. . . . The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened selfgovernment and a necessary means to protect it.” (citation omitted)).
147. See generally Richards & Calvert, supra note 133 (discussing the
counterspeech doctrine and providing examples of its use).
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not let the deference counseled by the principle of stare decisis 148 stop
the Court from overruling a precedent in “Austin [that] threatens to
subvert the ‘principled and intelligible’ development of our First
Amendment jurisprudence.” 149 Roberts was particularly concerned
that the government in Citizens United was making new arguments to
save Austin—arguments he contended depended “on radically reconceptualizing [the Austin decision’s] reasoning” 150 and that were never
relied upon by the Austin Court to support its decision. 151 For the
Chief Justice, deference to past decisions was not due under stare
decisis because
[s]tare decisis is a doctrine of preservation, not transformation.
It counsels deference to past mistakes, but provides no
justification for making new ones. There is therefore no basis for
the Court to give precedential sway to reasoning that it has
never accepted, simply because that reasoning happens to
support a conclusion reached on different grounds that have
since been abandoned or discredited. 152

Ultimately, as Citizens United’s counsel James Bopp wrote in
2011, the majority’s ruling stands for the following principle: “when
evaluating laws in the First Amendment context, courts must
determine whether legislative remedies comply with the Constitution,
without deference to the legislature’s determination of the remedy’s
constitutionality.” 153 In accord with Professor’s Huq’s observation
about the Court putting the “strict” in strict scrutiny in Citizens
United, 154 Bopp argued that the decision made it clear “courts owe no
deference to the remedy the government chooses” 155 in the First
Amendment context and that under strict scrutiny, “the government
must be put to its proof.” 156 Similarly, Professor William D. Araiza
148. Roberts, for instance, referred to “the special deference we accord to
precedent.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 924 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. (“The Court in Austin nowhere relied upon the only arguments
the Government now raises to support that decision.”).
152. Id.
153. James Bopp, Jr. et al., The Game Changer: Citizens United’s Impact on
Campaign Finance Law in General and Corporate Political Speech in
Particular, 9 First Amend. L. Rev. 251, 322 (2011) (emphasis added).
154. Huq, supra note 139, at 18 (using Citizens United as an example of the
Court applying “a truly strict scrutiny standard”).
155. Bopp, supra note 153, at 331.
156. Id.
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wrote that Citizens United reflected “rigidity” in the Court’s “refusal
to defer to congressional judgments relevant to the First Amendment
issue.” 157
For some liberal-leaning constitutional scholars, this abject lack of
deference to Congressional determinations in Citizens United is more
than a little ironic because it reflects judicial activism by an
ostensibly conservative Roberts Court. Constitutional law scholar
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky captured this sentiment extremely well in a
recent article:
Citizens United should put to rest the constant conservative
attack on judicial activism. By any measure, Citizens United
was stunning in its judicial activism. The deference to the
democratic process so often preached by conservatives in
attacking liberal rulings protecting rights was nowhere in
evidence as the conservative majority struck down restrictions
on corporate spending that have existed for decades. 158

Illustrating the rift on deference among the Justices in Citizens
United, Justice Stevens filed a lengthy dissent that, as Professor
Araiza pointed out, “took issue with the majority’s rigidity” 159 on
what Araiza called “the deference point.” 160 Professor Araiza contended that Justice Stevens “provided a more nuanced discussion of
the argument for deference to congressional findings about the
corrupting effect of corporate and union speech.” 161
Justice Stevens, for instance, wrote that the Court “shows great
disrespect for a coequal branch.” 162 He derided the majority’s decision,
opining at one point that “[r]ather than show any deference to a
coordinate branch of Government, the majority thus rejects the
anticorruption rationale without serious analysis. Today’s opinion
provides no clear rationale for being so dismissive of Congress.” 163
Suggesting the majority’s non-deferential approach conflicted with its
traditional tack, Stevens asserted that “[m]any of our campaign

157. William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law
Project: First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40
Stetson L. Rev. 821, 822 (2011).
158. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword:
Conservative Judicial Activism, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 863, 873 (2011).
159. Araiza, supra note 157, at 827.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 940 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
163. Id. at 968 (footnote omitted).
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finance precedents explicitly and forcefully affirm the propriety of
such presumptive deference.” 164
The bottom line from Citizens United is a clear split on the
deference owed to Congress when it adopts laws affecting political
speech. While Justice Kennedy’s overt lack of deference to Congress is
perhaps best encapsulated by his assertion that the First Amendment
is “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power” 165—in other words,
a mistrust of legislative action that mandates ultra-strict scrutiny by
the judiciary—Justice Stevens adopted a more deferential stance that
would have upheld the stricken statute.
D. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project:
Divisions on Deference Granted to Congress
in the Name of National Security Stifles Speech

As with Citizens United, the 2010 case of Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project 166 involved both political expression and a question of
how much deference Congress deserves when adopting a law that
allegedly violates the First Amendment. But unlike Citizens United, a
majority of justices in Humanitarian Law Project gladly granted
deference to Congress because of the presence of a variable decidedly
not at stake in Citizens United—national security.
Humanitarian Law Project (a case argued on behalf of the
government by soon-to-be Justice Elena Kagan) involved an asapplied, First Amendment-based challenge to the constitutionality of
a federal statute 167 prohibiting the giving of material support—
including “expert advice or assistance” 168—to a foreign terrorist organization. 169 The plaintiffs wanted to provide material support in the
form of speech to two organizations, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(also known as the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan) and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam. 170 The parties agreed that the Government’s
interest in combating terrorism is urgent and of the highest order. 171
In authoring the majority opinion upholding the prohibition on
material support to terrorist groups, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
164. Id. at 969.
165. Id. at 898 (majority opinion).
166. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006).
168. § 2339B(g)(4).
169. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722 (observing that the
Court had to “consider whether the material-support statute, as applied
to plaintiffs, violates the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment”).
170. Id. at 2713–14.
171. Id. at 2724.
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five colleagues, 172 gave great deference to both Congress and the
executive branch. 173 Although making it clear deference in this area is
neither absolute nor the same as judicial abdication, 174 Roberts wrote,
among other things:
◦ “[E]valuation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s
assessment, is entitled to deference. This litigation implicates
sensitive and weighty interests of national security and
foreign affairs.” 175
◦ “It is vital in this context ‘not to substitute . . . our own
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the
Legislative Branch.’” 176
◦ “[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual
inferences in this area, ‘the lack of competence on the part of
the courts is marked,’ and respect for the Government’s
conclusions is appropriate.” 177
◦ “In this area perhaps more than any other, the Legislature’s
superior capacity for weighing competing interests means that
‘we must be particularly careful not to substitute our
judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress.’” 178

These bullet points indicate that deference is owed to Congress on
national security issues because of its perceived expertise—its
“superior capacity for weighing competing interests” 179—and, con172. Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel Alito joined Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion.
Id. at 2712.
173. See id. at 2727 (“In analyzing whether it is possible in practice to
distinguish material support for a foreign terrorist group’s violent
activities and its nonviolent activities, we do not rely exclusively on our
own inferences drawn from the record evidence. We have before us an
affidavit stating the Executive Branch’s conclusion on that question.”).
174. See id. (“[C]oncerns of national security and foreign relations do not
warrant abdication of the judicial role. We do not defer to the
Government’s reading of the First Amendment, even when such
interests are at stake.”).
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68
(1981)).
177. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at
65).
178. Id. at 2728 (emphasis added) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68).
179. Id.
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versely, because of the Court’s own “lack of competence” 180 in collecting and evaluating evidence on such issues. The only inquiry left for
the Court is to determine if Congress made a “reasonable
evaluation” 181 of the evidence.
Deference in such situations is not surprising. As Professor George
D. Brown recently wrote, a lawsuit like that in Humanitarian Law
Project represents a “challenge[] to the government’s anti-terrorism
policies. What is the proper role of the courts in such challenges?
They inevitably produce calls for judicial deference in matters of national security, calls which are often heeded.” 182 While deference is
common in national security cases, Professor Peter Margulies nonetheless believed the Court went too far in Humanitarian Law Project,
deriding its decision as “an unnecessary expansion of deference.” 183
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s approach, Justice Breyer
authored a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, that
openly criticized the majority’s deferential tack. Breyer, for instance,
opined that while the majority “would defer strongly to Congress’
‘informed judgment,’” 184 he found “no evidence that Congress has
made such a judgment regarding the specific activities at issue in
these cases.” 185 Although conceding “the Government’s expertise in
foreign affairs may warrant deference in respect to many matters,” 186
Breyer emphasized that “it remains for this Court to decide whether
the Government has shown that such an interest justifies
criminalizing speech activity otherwise protected by the First Amendment.” 187 Breyer encapsulated his views (and those of Ginsburg and
Sotomayor) on deference in national security matters, writing that
these cases require us to consider how to apply the First
Amendment where national security interests are at stake.
When deciding such cases, courts are aware and must respect
the fact that the Constitution entrusts to the Executive and
Legislative Branches the power to provide for the national
180. Id. at 2727 (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68).
181. Id. (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68).
182. George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on Terror—
Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 Fla.
L. Rev. 193, 197 (2011).
183. Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors,
and Freedom of Speech, 63 Hastings L.J. 455, 463 (2012).
184. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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defense, and that it grants particular authority to the President
in matters of foreign affairs. Nonetheless, this Court has also
made clear that authority and expertise in these matters do not
automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure the
protection that the Constitution grants to individuals. 188

The deference problem illustrated by Humanitarian Law Project
is obvious: both the majority and dissent claimed not to adopt all-ornothing, absolutist stances on deference regarding national security,
yet they clearly diverged on where the proper metes and bounds of
deference to Congress on national security interests lie when First
Amendment speech interests are jeopardized. Deference thus is not a
binary concept but, instead, is one with shades of gray that are
seemingly adopted based on each Justice’s personal sensibilities about
striking an appropriate balance between judicial abdication and
judicial activism.
E. Banks v. Beard: Disagreement on Deference Owed to
Prison Officials in the Name of Serving Penological Interests

The last time the Supreme Court directly addressed the First
Amendment right of inmates to access media content was in 2006 in
Beard v. Banks. 189 Beard centered on a Pennsylvania prison policy
prohibiting the most “specially dangerous and recalcitrant inmates” 190
from accessing any newspapers or magazines. 191 Under the policy, the
only media content these inmates may lawfully possess are “legal and
personal correspondence, religious and legal materials, two library
books, and writing paper.” 192
Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the judgment of the Court in a
plurality opinion joined by three Justices. 193 Two other Justices
concurred in the judgment. 194 Breyer explained that the basic, substantive principles governing the case were rooted in the Court’s 1987
188. Id. at 2743.
189. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 525.
191. See id. at 526 (noting that, under the policy at issue for prisoners in
Level 2 of Pennsylvania’s Long Term Segregation Unit, inmates “have
no access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs”).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 524. Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Anthony Kennedy and David Souter joined.
194. See id. at 536–42 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Clarence Thomas,
joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, concurred only in the judgment, as he
would uphold the restrictions based solely on the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 537.
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opinion in Turner v. Safley 195 and its 2003 decision in Overton v.
Bazzetta. 196 Synthesizing these two prisoner-rights cases, Breyer made
four key points: (1) prisoners do possess First Amendment speech
rights; 197 (2) those rights, however, are not the same as those possessed by non-incarcerated individuals; 198 (3) substantial deference
must be granted to prison officials when evaluating restrictions on
prisoners’ rights; 199 and (4) the constitutional rights of prisoners may
permissibly be abridged if they are reasonably related to legitimate
penological concerns. 200
The Turner-based test deployed in Beard amounts to a very
relaxed form of judicial scrutiny. 201 The Court calls it a “reasonableness standard,” 202 in stark contrast to strict scrutiny, 203 and legal
commentators refer to it as “a rational basis standard of review.” 204
Professor Giovanna Shay asserts that the Turner test “emphasizes
deference to prison officials and the relative technical and
administrative expertise of corrections authorities.” 205
Expounding on the nature of the substantial deference owed to
prison officials, Justice Breyer wrote that when it comes to “disputed

195. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
196. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
197. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 528 (“This Court recognized in Turner that
imprisonment does not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain
important constitutional protections, including those of the First
Amendment.”).
198. See id. (“[T]he Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of
such rights in a prison than it would allow elsewhere.”).
199. See id. (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 132) (“[C]ourts owe ‘substantial
deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators.’”).
200. Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 87).
201. See Matthew D. Rose, Comment, Prisoners and Public Employees:
Bridges to a New Future in Prisoners’ Free Speech Retaliation Claims,
5 Seventh Circuit Rev. 159, 160 (2009) (“Turner . . . established a
very deferential rational basis standard of review.”).
202. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). The Court explained
that the decision to use a reasonableness standard in Turner and
subsequent cases “stemmed from its concern that . . . a strict standard
simply was not appropriate for consideration of regulations that are
centrally concerned with the maintenance of order and security within
prisons.” Id. at 409–10.
203. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining the strict scrutiny
standard).
204. Rose, supra note 201, at 170.
205. Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 329,
341 (2009).
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matters of professional judgment,” 206 the Court’s “inferences must
accord deference to the views of prison authorities.” 207 This reflects a
trend of greater deference toward correctional administrators that
emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. 208
The High Court’s test for measuring the validity of restrictions on
inmates’ speech reflects deference because, unlike strict scrutiny, it
requires a very low burden of proof—namely, whether or not the
regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological
concerns. 209 Swapping out the word penological for pedagogical, this
test mirrors the equally deferential test developed by the Court in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 210 to address cases involving
student speech that occurs as part of the curriculum or is school
sponsored. As one commentator observed, “[t]he notion of reasonable
relatedness employed in both tests gives wide berth to the enforcing
authorities’ discretion, be it prison officials or school administrators,
as compared to a hypothetically more stringent ‘directly related’
nexus requirement.” 211
Applying this deferential standard in Beard, Breyer and the
plurality ruled for the Pennsylvania prison officials and their speechrestrictive policy, opining that they “set forth adequate legal support
for the policy. And the plaintiff, a prisoner who attacks the policy,
has failed to set forth ‘specific facts’ that, in light of the deference
that courts must show to the prison officials, could warrant a
determination in his favor.” 212
In reaching this pro-censorship conclusion, Breyer pointed out
that prison officials tendered multiple reasons for restricting access to
reading materials,
including the need to motivate better behavior on the part of
particularly difficult prisoners, the need to minimize the amount
of property they control in their cells, and the need to ensure

206. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (plurality opinion).
207. Id.
208. Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights,
17 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 83, 90 (2007).
209. Beard, 548 U.S. at 528.
210. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood,
the Court wrote that “[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273.
211. Clay Calvert, Bylines Behind Bars: Fame, Frustration & First
Amendment Freedom, 28 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 71, 98 (2008).
212. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525 (emphasis added).
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prison safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of
material a prisoner might use to start a cell fire. 213

Breyer determined that the first of these justifications—giving
inmates enhanced incentives to rehabilitate their behavior by
depriving them of media content—was adequate to support the ban
and he went no further into the other interests. 214 The ostensible
incentive for good behavior, under the Pennsylvania policy, is that
positive conduct eventually leads to “somewhat less severe
restrictions, including the right to receive one newspaper and five
magazines.” 215 Justice Breyer thus reasoned that “[t]he articulated
connections between newspapers and magazines, the deprivation of
virtually the last privilege left to an inmate, and a significant
incentive to improve behavior, are logical ones.” 216
Professor Christopher Smith labels the Beard plurality’s approach
“an especially deferential application of an already-deferential test for
violations of prisoners’ rights.” 217 Another legal commentator goes
even further:
[T]he Court provided unprecedented deference in light of the
serious deprivation involved. Accepting the administrations’
justification that prisoners should have limited access to reading
materials to encourage better behavior and reduce the threat of
violent or destructive behavior, the Court rolled over, leaving
room for the great possibility that any fundamental right could
be acceptably denied if justified by rehabilitation. 218

Justice Breyer and the plurality’s deferential approach in Beard
drew pushback in the form of a dissent by Justice Ginsburg—a
dissent that prompted Breyer to respond that “[c]ontrary to Justice
Ginsburg’s suggestion, we do not suggest that the deference owed
prison authorities makes it impossible for prisoners or others attacking
a prison policy like the present one ever to succeed or to survive
summary judgment. After all, the constitutional interest here is an
important one.” 219 The latter sentence, of course, is a reference to
213. Id. at 530.
214. See id. at 531 (“[W]e believe that the first rationale itself satisfies
Turner’s requirements.”).
215. Id. at 526.
216. Id. at 531–32.
217. Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’
Rights, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 853, 881 (2011).
218. Anna C. Burns, Note, Beard v. Banks: Restricted Reading,
Rehabilitation, and Prisoners’ First Amendment Rights, 15 J.L. &
Pol’y 1225, 1269 (2007) (emphasis added).
219. Beard, 548 U.S. at 535 (citation omitted).
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First Amendment interest in free speech, while the former seemingly
represents an effort to blunt the charge that the plurality’s approach
is so deferential as to completely cut off inmates’ possibilities of
having any success under it.
In her Beard dissent, Justice Ginsburg raised the specter of
judicial abdication of duty by the plurality. 220 In particular, she was
concerned that the plurality’s deferential approach eclipsed evidentiary assumptions traditionally made in favor of the non-moving party
in summary judgment motions. She wrote that while notions of
deference to prison officials “can and should be incorporated into the
evaluation of a motion for summary judgment, that deference should
come into play, pretrial, only after the facts shown are viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all inferences are
drawn in that party’s favor.” 221 She explained:
All inferences are to be drawn in favor of the prisoner opposing
the regulation, and the question is not which side has the better
argument, but whether the Secretary has shown he is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. By elevating the summary
judgment opponent’s burden to a height prisoners lacking
nimble counsel cannot reach, the plurality effectively tells prison
officials they will succeed in cases of this order, and swiftly,
while barely trying. It suffices for them to say, in our
professional judgment the restriction is warranted. 222

In addition to Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens filed a dissent
also intimating that the plurality’s approach was too deferential, at
least in terms of scrutinizing the assertions and evidence set forth by
Pennsylvania prison officials. In particular, Stevens called the evidentiary support for Pennsylvania’s position “exceedingly tenuous. When
the logical connection between prison officials’ stated interests and the
restrictions on prisoners’ constitutional rights is not self-evident, we
have considered whether prison officials proffered any evidence that
their regulations served the values they identified.” 223 It is important
to recognize that Justice Stevens purported to apply the exact same
test or rule as the plurality, 224 but he gave far less hands-off deference
when it came to evaluating the government’s evidence under the test.

220. Id. at 554–55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 555.
222. Id. at 556.
223. Id. at 550 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 542 (noting that the reasonably related to legitimate
penological concerns test was the correct rule to be applied “[w]hen a
prison regulation impinges upon First Amendment freedoms”).
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Justices Ginsburg and Stevens are not the only ones to criticize
the plurality’s deferential approach in Beard. In a 2011 law journal
article, Erwin Chemerinsky blasted Justice Breyer’s opinion:
The Court’s deference to the government was stunning. This is a
regulation that denies prisoners access to all newspapers,
magazines, and even family photographs. It is hard to imagine a
more extensive restriction of First Amendment rights. There
was no evidence that this actually improves prisoner behavior,
and in fact, the Court said that none was needed. The
government’s assertion of a benefit was sufficient to justify the
restriction on speech. 225

Ultimately, then, even when the Justices appear to agree in
theory to apply the same legal rule—one that is itself already
deferential—they nonetheless may disagree on the metes and bounds
of that deference in practice. Deference in practice thus dirties the
semantic hygiene that a seemingly clear sounding rational basis test
like that in Beard appears to provide. Beard, in turn, illustrates that
there can be both: (1) deferential applications of already deferential
legal standards; and (2) more rigorous approaches to those same
deferential standards.
F.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.: Deferring to an
Administrative Agency in the Realm of Indecency

Under federal law, 226 the Federal Communications Commission
can fine 227 over-the-air broadcasters for conveying indecent content,
which it currently defines as “language or material that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory organs or activities.” 228 Although the Supreme Court’s
2009 ruling in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 229 did not reach
the substantive First Amendment issues surrounding the FCC’s

225. Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 723,
728 (2011) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”).
227. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2006) (providing, in relevant part, that
the FCC can issue a maximum forfeiture penalty of $325,000 for each
violation for broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language).
228. Guide: Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/
guides/obscenity-indecency-and-profanity (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
229. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I ), 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
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broadcast indecency policies 230—and the Court again dodged the First
Amendment issues in 2012 231—the majority nonetheless engaged in an
exceedingly deferential review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) in upholding the Commission’s ability to change its
indecency policy and, in the process, to further limit the speech rights
of broadcasters. Under the FCC’s new policy, the lack of repetition of
an expletive “is not a safe harbor” 232 for broadcasters, and the FCC
can instead enforce its policy against “isolated or fleeting broadcasts” 233 of indecent language. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the FCC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for justifying its
about-face in suddenly targeting fleeting expletives after years of
having not done so. 234
In delivering the opinion of the Court in the FCC’s favor, Justice
Scalia explained the deferential approach—what he called a
“narrow” 235 standard of review—that the Justices must take under the
APA. In particular, they will only reverse an agency’s policy change if
its decision was arbitrary or capricious, 236 a statutorily mandated
standard of review. 237 For the Scalia majority, this meant that the

230. See id. at 516, 529 (declining “to address the constitutional questions,”
and adding that the change to the FCC’s indecency policy “is a separate
question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge”).
231. After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the APA issue, the
Second Circuit found the FCC regulations impermissibly vague under
the First Amendment. 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010). The Court again
granted certiorari, this time “for decision on the constitutional
question.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II ), 132 S. Ct.
2307 (2012). The Court determined in Fox II that FCC’s abrupt aboutface on fleeting expletives and brief nudity failed to provide the
broadcasters with sufficient notice, and the FCC’s standards were
therefore unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. Id. at
2320. Because the Court struck down the FCC’s indecency policy on
Fifth Amendment grounds, the Court refrained from addressing the
First Amendment implications of the policy. Id.
232. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 512.
233. Id. at 509.
234. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir.
2007) (“The Networks contend that the Remand Order is arbitrary and
capricious because the FCC has made a 180-degree turn regarding its
treatment of ‘fleeting expletives’ without providing a reasoned
explanation justifying the about-face. We agree.”), vacated, 556 U.S. 502
(2009).
235. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 513.
236. Id.
237. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (providing that a court can hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
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FCC’s predictive judgments about what might happen to the use of
expletives in the broadcast medium if its policy did not change
“merits deference,” 238 and the FCC
need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons
for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute,
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes
it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately
indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide
a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new
policy created on a blank slate. 239

One highlight from Justice Scalia’s Fox I opinion illustrates the
vast deference given to the FCC and, perhaps more importantly,
provides a stark contrast with his decidedly non-deferential approach
on the proof-of-harm question in Brown. 240 In particular, Scalia contended in Fox I that
[t]here are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence
can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity
on children is one of them. One cannot demand a multiyear
controlled study, in which some children are intentionally
exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all other
indecency), and others are shielded from all indecency. 241

The only evidence necessary to support the FCC’s position was,
in Scalia’s view, common sense: “Here it suffices to know that children
mimic the behavior they observe—or at least the behavior that is
presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming replete
with one-word indecent expletives will tend to produce children who
use (at least) one-word indecent expletives.” 242 Justice Scalia’s view
about the non-necessity of empirical proof of harm fits neatly with the
Supreme Court’s observation in the obscenity 243 case of Paris Adult

be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”).
238. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 521 (“[E]ven in the absence of evidence, the agency’s
predictive judgment (which merits deference) makes entire sense. To
predict that complete immunity for fleeting expletives, ardently desired
by broadcasters, will lead to a substantial increase in fleeting expletives
seems to us an exercise in logic rather than clairvoyance.”).
239. Id. at 515.
240. See supra Part II.A.
241. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 519.
242. Id.
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Theatre I v. Slaton that “[f]rom the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions.” 244
Counterposed to such a deferential evidentiary tack, Justice
Breyer dissented in Fox I. He concluded the FCC’s change in policy
to target fleeting expletives was, in fact, arbitrary and capricious. 245
Illustrating his rigorous approach to the APA’s facially deferential
standard, Justice Breyer called attention to the First Amendment
interests at stake that, in his view, should have been factored into the
FCC’s change-of-policy calculus:
[T]he FCC said next to nothing about the relation between the
change it made in its prior “fleeting expletive” policy and the
First-Amendment-related need to avoid “censorship,” a matter
as closely related to broadcasting regulation as is health to that
of the environment. The reason that discussion of the matter is
particularly important here is that the FCC had explicitly rested
its prior policy in large part upon the need to avoid treading too
close to the constitutional line. 246

This observation is important because Breyer suggested that even
when a transparently deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard of
review is deployed, it must be implemented in a rigorous fashion when
First Amendment interests are at stake. Furthermore, agencies must
provide courts with much more detailed explanations for their
changes in policy, with Justice Breyer observing that
the FCC’s answer to the question, “Why change?” is, “We like
the new policy better.” This kind of answer, might be perfectly
satisfactory were it given by an elected official. But when given
by an agency, in respect to a major change of an important
policy where much more might be said, it is not sufficient. 247

Justice Breyer thus concluded that the Second Circuit was correct
in Fox Television Stations that the FCC’s policy switch on indecency
did, in fact, violate the APA. 248 Ultimately, as Professor Robin
243. Obscene expression is not protected by the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free speech. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (“We have repeatedly held that the protection of
the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech.”); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“[O]bscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”).
244. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (emphasis
added).
245. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 553.
247. Id. at 567.
248. Id.
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Kundis Craig wrote, Fox I “leaves federal courts with multiple rules
for how to approach arbitrary-and-capricious review when a federal
agency changes policy.” 249 Deference granted to the FCC led to a procensorship result, just as it did in Morse, Beard, and Humanitarian
Law Project.

Conclusion
This Article deployed deference as a lens for analyzing a halfdozen decisions by the Roberts Court affecting free expression. Using
this data set of factually diverse cases, the Article illustrated how
varying conceptions and standards of deference affect First Amendment rights in different circumstances and contexts.
Furthermore, the Article demonstrated the pliant nature of
deference and the related disagreements among the Justices over when
and how much deference should be afforded in any given case.
Perhaps most significantly, this Article revealed how the Justices
differed on deference in several high-profile First Amendment cases
including Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, Morse v.
Frederick, Citizens United v. FEC, and Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project. That quintet of cases illustrates disparate views on deference
toward:
◦ social scientists;
◦ public school administrators;
◦ Congress; and
◦ an administrative agency (the FCC).

Even in cases not so visible to the public, such as the prison
speech case of Beard v. Banks, there are disagreements among the
Justices on deference. Indeed, the split in Beard suggests that what
purports to be a deferential standard of review to start with can be
applied in either an exceedingly deferential or minimally deferential
fashion.
Encapsulating the findings from the six cases examined here, the
majority or plurality’s denial of (or reduced level of) deference led to
free speech victories in Brown (denial of deference to social scientists
resulted in striking down California’s violent video game statute) and
Citizens United (denial of deference to Congress resulted in striking
down federal rules limiting the political speech rights of corporations
and unions). In contrast, the deference granted to Congress in
249. Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes:
The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 Emory L.J.
1, 40 (2011).
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Humanitarian Law Project, to prison officials in Beard, to educators
in Morse, and to the FCC in Fox I all resulted in pro-censorship
outcomes.
Deference, of course, is merely one lens through which to filter
First Amendment-based cases. This Article, however, laid bare the
pivotal role deference can play in a case’s outcome. Like a spigot,
deference can be turned on and off by the Court, and even when it is
turned on, it can be made either to flow freely and with full force or it
can be reduced to a mere trickle. It is precisely such subjectivity and
flexibility that makes it a critical concept to understand. Deference
amounts to a judicial wildcard, as it were, that justices can employ—
regardless of whether they claim to be applying strict scrutiny, 250
intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review—to help sustain a law’s
constitutionality. Merely claiming to apply strict scrutiny, for instance, does not necessarily result in rigorous judicial review if
deference is factored into the equation. The bottom line is that
deference is an elastic concept that muddies judicial analysis and
sacrifices First Amendment rights when deployed in large doses.
Given the disparities among the Justices on the Roberts Court
regarding deference in First Amendment-based controversies, as illustrated in this Article, it is apparent that deference, as a concept, is
too loosely bandied about and trotted out on an as-needed basis,
rather than being used with consistency, predictability, and analytical
rigor. This is particularly troublesome because failing to bestow any
deference on an entity like Congress can lead to charges of judicial
activism 251 that seriously undermine the Court’s legitimacy. Conversely, being perceived as overly deferential can result in perhaps
equally damning allegations of judicial abdication. 252
How can one explain the differences in deference across the
various First Amendment cases addressed here? It is not always
necessary. For example, perhaps the greater deference afforded to
public school officials by the majority in Morse, as compared to the
lack of deference given to social scientists by the majority in Brown,
can be parsed in several ways. First, public school principals and
administrators are, like the Justices themselves, government officials
tasked with a specific governmental leadership role. The deference
may thus be explained, in part, as a natural conferral of respect,
250. The notion of applying deference in the strict scrutiny context seems
oxymoronic—strictly deferential?—but it exists. See Ozan O. Varol,
Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 1243,
1256–58 (2010) (describing the majority’s mix of strict scrutiny and
deference in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
251. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 158, at 867 (discussing the current
judicial activism of the Court).
252. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s
negative view of judicial deference).
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esteem, and expertise from one governmental official to another. And
although social scientists may be experts in their fields and also may
be government employees (if they work at state-related universities),
they need not be government employees (if they work at private
universities or corporations or think tanks). Furthermore, even when
social scientists are government employees of public universities, their
roles as social scientists are not those of government officials tasked
with leadership responsibility on a scale with public school administrators who are in charge of hundreds and sometimes thousands of
students, teachers, and others.
Second, educators’ decisions necessarily entail subjective judgment
calls about when student speech should be censored. In contrast,
social scientists—at least those whose work was at issue in Brown—
deal in the world of empirical facts. The former realm, given its
inherent murkiness and the need for quick, on-the-fly decision making
when a speech crisis arises unexpectedly on campus, demands more
deference than the latter realm, which purports to objectively measure
outcomes, in highly controlled situations, with statistical significance.
In other situations, the authors of this Article posit that there
may be latent assumptions—assumptions hidden behind the typical
reasons for granting deference of perceived expertise and knowledge—
about why deference actually is granted. For instance, in both Morse
and Beard the individuals impacted by the bestowal of deference on,
respectively, school officials and prison administrators are, for all
intents and purposes, second-class First Amendment citizens 253—
namely, minors and prisoners. Put differently, it may be easier to
grant deference to would-be censors in these scenarios because the
classes of individuals whose speech rights are gored in the process are
perceived as somehow less worthy of receiving full First Amendment
protection. Similarly, negatively affecting the speech rights of a nonprofit human rights group like the Humanitarian Law Project 254 may
seem like a small price to pay for providing deference that safeguards
more than 300 million people in the name of national security.

253. This term has been used by others to describe the judicial treatment
under the First Amendment of both broadcasters and the purveyors of
commercial speech. See Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert,
Contrasting Concurrences of Clarence Thomas: Deploying Originalism
and Paternalism in Commercial and Student Speech Cases, 26 Ga. St.
U. L. Rev. 321, 323 n.19 (2010) (describing uses of the phrase “secondclass First Amendment citizens”).
254. The group describes itself as “a non-profit organization founded in 1985,
dedicated to protecting human rights and promoting the peaceful
resolution of conflict by using established international human rights
laws and humanitarian law.” Humanitarian L. Project, http://hlp.
home.igc.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
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A final point is important: Chief Justice Roberts has been highly
successful in some extremely controversial First Amendment-based
cases, such as United States v. Stevens 255 and Snyder v. Phelps, 256 in
bringing together nearly all of his colleagues in rendering pro-speech
decisions. As Chief Justice, Roberts should find it equally important—
certainly for purposes of adding clarity and consistency to judicial
decision making, and perhaps more selfishly for securing his own
legacy—to try to bring the Justices together on conceptions of
deference. Without consistency across the Justices on deference,
standards such as strict scrutiny lose clarity. For example, if two
Justices both purport to apply strict scrutiny, but one embraces
deference for the governmental entity that proposed the law in
question and the other does not, it is hard to claim they are, in fact,
using the same strict scrutiny test.
Ultimately, the cliché goes that the devil is in the details. If that
is the case, then deference certainly is the devil in the details of
judicial analysis that plagues clarity and predictability in a diverse
range of First Amendment-based scenarios under the Roberts Court.

255. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). Justice Samuel Alito
found himself isolated in Stevens from his eight colleagues on the Court
as the lone dissenting justice. Id. at 1592–1602 (Alito, J., dissenting).
256. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). Justice Samuel Alito was
isolated in Snyder from his eight colleagues on the Court as the solitary
dissenter. Id. at 1222–29 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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